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Abstract
We study a local version of the Minority Game, where agents are placed on the
nodes of a directed graph. Agents care about being in the minority of the group of
agents they are currently linked to and employ myopic best-reply rules to choose their
next-period state. We show that, in this benchmark case, the smaller the size of local
networks, the larger long-run population-average payoﬀs. We then explore the collec-
tive behavior of the system when agents can: (i) assign weights to each link they hold
and modify them over time in response to payoﬀ signals; (ii) delete badly-performing
links (i.e., opponents) and replace them with randomly chosen ones. Simulations
suggest that, when agents are allowed to weigh links but cannot delete/replace them,
the system self-organizes into networked clusters that attain very high payoﬀ values.
These clustered conﬁgurations are not stable and can easily be disrupted, generating
huge subsequent payoﬀ drops. If, however, agents can (and are suﬃciently willing to)
discard badly performing connections, the system quickly converges to stable states
where all agents get the highest payoﬀ, independently of the size of the networks
initially in place.
Keywords: Minority Games, Local Interactions, Endogenous Networks, Adaptive
Agents.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, C73.
1 Introduction
In the last years, both physicists and economists have become increasingly interested in
investigating the collective properties of dispersed dynamical systems composed of many
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1boundedly-rational agents who directly interact over time (Kirman, 1997).
A well-known instance of such a system is the Minority Game (MG), ﬁrst introduced
as a model of inductive rationality in the famous “El-Farol Bar Problem” by W. Brian
Arthur (Arthur, 1994) and then explored in details by Challet and Zhang (1997).
In a nutshell, the standard formulation of the MG envisages a population of N (odd)
players who repeatedly choose a binary state (−1 or +1). In each time period t =1 ,2,...,
the state chosen by the minority wins. Agents who are in the minority get a point, the
others get zero. Agents are only allowed to observe the last m ≥ 1 winning sides: history is
the only common information. To choose their next-period state, players use one of their
k ≥ 2 strategies, each strategy being a lookup table assigning an output (i.e., the state
to be chosen in the next period) to any of the 2m possible state conﬁgurations. Agents
always select their best-performing strategy to make their choice. The performance of
any given strategy evolves through time. Agents are initially endowed with a random
repertoire of strategies, drawn at random from the pool of all 22m conceivable ones. If an
agent is successful in a given time period, it assigns a point to all strategies that would
have predicted the winning state – no matter if they were actually used or not – and zero
otherwise.
The standard MG has become a paradigm for studying systems where adaptive agents
compete for scarce resources and has been recently employed to study the dynamics of
stock markets and market-entry games (see, inter alia, Challet, Marsili, and Zhang (2000),
Marsili and Challet (2001), Bottazzi, Devetag, and Dosi (2003) and Ochs (1990, 1995)).
From a theoretical perspective, the standard MG model has been extensively studied both
numerically and analytically (Challet and Zhang, 1998) and a huge number of contributions
have been exploring a large spectrum of possible extensions (see the Minority Game’s web
page http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/minority in the Econophysics Forum Internet Site
for an exhaustive annotated bibliography).
In particular, a recent stream of research has investigated the consequences of relaxing
two key assumptions of the basic framework, namely global interactions (each agent cares
2about being in the minority of the whole population) and common information (all players
have access to the same information – the globally winning side). The underlying idea
is that each agent playing the MG could instead have access only to a local source of
information, for example the state played in the past by those agents who are the “closest
ones” in some underlying socio-economic space (Fagiolo, 1998). For example, Paczuski,
Bassler, and Corral (2000) models a MG where agents are placed in a Kauﬀman NK-
network (Kauﬀman, 1993). Agents can only observe the state of the individuals they are
currently linked with and hold only one strategy. The latter maps the past state of one’s
neighbors into the state to be chosen in the next period. Similarly, Kalinowski, Schulz,
and Briese (2000) and Slanina (2000) place their agents over one-dimensional boundaryless
lattices (circles) and allow them to observe the states held in the recent past by their
nearest-neighbors. Notice, however, that in these models agents interact locally but play
globally the MG: players are indeed rewarded only if they choose the globally winning side.
Conversely, Moelbert and De Los Rios (2002) studies a local MG in which the population is
spatially distributed over a regular lattice with nearest-neighbor interactions. Agents only
observe time t − 1 states played by their neighbors and care about being in the minority
of their local group.
Although the study of “local” versions of the standard setup has been shedding some
light on the ways in which heterogeneous information aﬀects collective MG dynamics, very
little attention has been paid to the role played by network structures and local interac-
tions in shaping long-run aggregate outcomes. For example, the existing literature has
extensively addressed the study of MGs played over very regular network structures such
as homogeneous lattices. On the contrary, the consequences of assuming more asymmetric
structures – such as generic, random directed graphs – are still poorly investigated (see
Kirley (2004) for an exception in the case of scale-free networks).
Furthermore, local MGs have almost exclusively focused on “frozen” or “static” in-
teraction structures. This means that agents always interact with the same opponents
and do not have the faculty to modify the structure of their network endogenously (see,
3however, Anghel, Toroczkai, Bassler, and Korniss (2004) and Lo, Chan, Hui, and John-
son (2004) for two examples of exogenous network dynamics). Nevertheless, endogenous
network formation is well-known to crucially alter the properties of collective dynamics in
spatial games (see for example the discussion in Fagiolo, Marengo, and Valente (2004) and
Fagiolo (2005)).
In this paper, we begin to explore in more detail the role played by networks (and the
evolution thereof) in local MGs.
We consider a population of N agents living in a discrete-time economy. Each agent is
initially connected through unilateral links (directed edges) to a fraction of other players,
whose last-period states are the only information they are allowed to observe. Agents are
rewarded with one point if they are successful – that is, if they play as the (strict) minority
of their local group does – and zero otherwise.
In any time period, only a fraction of the agents are allowed to consider whether to
change their state. Agents decide their next-period state by evaluating the state of their
local network.
We implement two network evaluation setups. In the ﬁrst one, we assume non-weighted
links: each opponent always counts as one, no matter what it did in the past. Therefore,
agents simply choose the state played by the strict minority of their peers. In the second
setup, we introduce weighted links. Each agent separately evaluates every link (opponent)
and assigns to it a weight that increases only if the linked agent suggested the minority
side in the past. State decisions will then depend upon a comparison between the sum of
weights associated to agents playing +1 and −1 in the local group. We call this second
setup a “weighted” minority game (WMG).
As far as network dynamics is concerned, we simulate the behavior of the system in
two scenarios. The ﬁrst scenario assumes frozen networks. The network initially in place
cannot be modiﬁed, and only their weights might possibly evolve. In the second scenario
endogenous networks are assumed: agents can decide whether to remove a badly performing
link, that is a link whose weight becomes smaller than a given threshold. Since agents do
4not have good knowledge of the region of the economy outside their local network, we
assume that the new opponent is chosen at random from the remaining set of agents.
We explore system behavior when the initial density of the network changes in alter-
native network evaluation setups and network dynamics scenarios. Preliminary simulation
exercises show that, in the non-weighted local MG with frozen networks, the smaller the
density of the network, the larger average payoﬀs. If, however, we assume a WMG with
frozen networks, the population tends to build a network of small clusters composed of
highly coordinated agents choosing the same state. Agents of one cluster keep assigning
more and more importance to agents of other clusters. These global conﬁgurations are not
in general robust and can be easily disrupted by subsequent network reassessments. Fluc-
tuating patterns for average payoﬀs are likely to emerge. Finally, we study what happens
when agents play the WMG over endogenous networks. In this case, the population splits
in two subgroups playing opposite states. Agents in a group are prevalently linked with
agents of the other group. Average payoﬀs converge to one. Thus, the population learns to
“globally win” the WMG by selecting the most convenient set of opponents in the game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally describes the model.
In Section 3 we present preliminary simulation results. Finally, Section 4 concludes and
discusses future developments.
2 The Model
We study a population of myopic agents i ∈ I = {1,...,N}, with N even, playing a minority
game in discrete time periods t =0 ,1,2,.... Each agent i is characterized by its binary
state st
i ∈{ − 1,+1} in the game and by the set V t
i ⊆ I −{ i} of other agents is currently
linked to (which we call interaction group).
We denote by ijt the directed edge linking agent i to j at time t. Since links are directed,
the fact that j ∈ V t
i does not necessarily imply that i ∈ V t
j . The collection {V t
i ,i∈ I} thus
induces at every t a directed graph over I. The set of directed edges (links) held by the
5agents may be interpreted as their “window over the world”. Agents play here a local MG:
they observe the part of the population which is relevant to them and adapt to a small
and local set of signals.
In each period, agents get a positive (unit) payoﬀ if they play the same as the minority
of their interaction group V
t−1
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We assume that, in each time period, any agent is allowed to revise its current state
with probability θ ∈ (0,1] and that agents earn the payoﬀ (1) even if they must stay
put (or if they do not actually change) their current state. The parameter θ governs the
state updating regime. If θ = 1, one has the standard “parallel updating scheme”. If
θ is suﬃciently small, then at most one agent has the option to update its state at t
(“asynchronous updating scheme”). Since the nature of the updating scheme has been
shown to crucially aﬀect the outcomes of dynamic systems such as the one studied here
(Page, 1997), it seems interesting to allow for diﬀerent updating frequencies in the model
(see also Section 4).
Agents are assumed to be myopic and to employ best-response strategies given their
local information (Blume, 1995). This means that agent i, when called to revise its state
at time t, can only observe time t − 1 variables concerning agents in V
t−1
i . Agents can be
considered to remain in a “dormant status” until they are woken-up and allowed to act upon
currently available information. Therefore, asynchronous updating (θ<1) and myopic
behavior allow one to model systems where agents behave on the grounds of heterogeneous
information.
We consider two alternative setups as to how updating agents evaluate the information
6coming from their local network and use that information in deciding their next-period
state.
In the ﬁrst setup, every linked agent (that is, every edge ijt−1) always counts as one,
independently of the past behavior of the opponent j. Therefore, agent i chooses, with




















We avoid any tie-breaking complications simply by assuming that all interaction groups
always contain an odd number of players (see also below). Our results are not dramatically
altered if one assumes stochastic TBRs (agents choose at random when a tie occurs) or
state-dependent ones (agents stick/switch to their current choice).
In the second setup, we implement a weighted version of the MG (WMG). We suppose
that each agent attaches an indicator of importance (weight) ηt
ij to each link ijt it maintains
(more on how weights are computed and evolve through time below). Given last-period
weights η
t−1
ij attached to agents j ∈ V
t−1
i , the agent drawn for state updating – say, i –





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




























where we denote by V
t−1




j = s} and s ∈{ − 1,+1}. In other words,
agents now use a weighted best-reply rule, where opponents do not all count as one and
their relative importance is given by their performance in the past.
After state updating (which happens – on average – for at most θ·N agents in each t),
payoﬀs of all agents are computed according to (1). Then, in the WMG setups, weights
7are updated over time. In each period, after strategies have been updated, each link is
assigned a score et
ij equal to 1 or 0, depending on whether the “suggestion” coming from
j was correct (that is, if it indicated the state played by the minority of the linked agents)
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ij +( 1− α)e
t
ij, (5)
where α ∈ [0,1] and ηt
ij ∈ [0,1].
Notice that by applying the weight updating rule in (5), agents trade-oﬀ their memory
about the “past contributions” from agent j with its “current contribution” (et
ij). The
parameter α tunes the memory eﬀect. If α   0, weights track very closely current scores
(no memory), whereas, if α   1, memory becomes very important. The ηt
ij series are
smoother and are quite robust to new scores. See Figure 1 for an example of weight series
generated by applying rule (5) to the same series of et
ij for alternative values of α (cf.
Skyrms and Pemantle (2000), Weisbuch, Kirman, and Herreiner (2000) and Kirman and
Vriend (2001) for a similar approach).
Weights provide an indication of how useful links have been in the past in helping to
take a correct decision, no matter if the player actually did choose a new state or was forced
to stick to its current one. In a sense, the collection {ηt
ij,j ∈ V
t−1
i } is a measure of how
much i’s interaction group has been able to eﬀectively and consistently convey information
to agent i. On average, the closer all weights {ηt
ij,j ∈ V
t−1
i } to 1, the more agent i can
























Figure 1: An example of the dynamics of individual weights. Equation (5) is applied over
the same time-series of scores et


















provides information about the overall helpfulness of agent i’s interaction group V
t−1
i .W e
employ squared weights to emphasize the contribution to Ht
i made by extreme-valued links,
that is opponents which are considered either as completely useless or completely helpful.
Finally, let us describe how networks evolve through time. At time t = 0, each agent
is randomly linked with L0 other agents. More formally, each agent is endowed with the
same (odd) number of links L0
i = L0 =  δN , where δ ∈ (0,1) is a proxy for the “density”
of the initial network and L0 ∈{ 1,3,5,...,N − 1}.
We experiment with two alternative scenarios as far as network dynamics is concerned.
In the ﬁrst one, frozen networks are assumed. Links cannot change in the entire process
and, under the WMG setup, weights can only be updated. This allows one to disentangle
the roles played by coordination, local interactions, and, possibly, weight updating in
9shaping collective behavior.
In the second setup, we study an endogenous networks system. After state updat-
ing, agents are allowed to discard badly-performing links. More formally, we introduce a














In line with the local nature of information diﬀusion in our economy, we assume that
agents replace any discarded link with a new one (randomly chosen from the set of all
currently unconnected agents) and that any new link is initially assigned a weight equal
to the average of the weights of all undiscarded links. Thus, the number of links that each
agent holds remains constant at any t (equal to L0).
3 Simulation Results
In this Section, we present some preliminary Monte-Carlo simulation exercises and discuss
the most important properties displayed by the collective behavior of the system.
We begin with a benchmark parametrization where: (i) the frequency of state updating
is θ =0 .20; (ii) the population size is N = 100.
Our main goal is to explore how networks inﬂuence collective dynamics. Therefore,
we start by studying what happens to the distribution of individual payoﬀs and to the
interaction structure (i.e. links and weights) when the “density” of the initial network (δ
or, equivalently, L0) changes in each of the following three setups:
1. Agents play a non-weighted MG and networks are frozen.
2. Agents play a weighted MG and networks are frozen.
3. Agents play a weighted MG and networks are endogenous.
10In all our exercises, we average our observations over M = 10 independent Monte-Carlo
simulations in order to wash away across-simulation variability. Moreover, we observe
the system dynamics until the economy has reached a suﬃciently stable behavior, which
typically happens for 2000 ≤ T ≤ 4000 for all (α,θ,N) setups explored in our simulations.
All foregoing results are quite robust to alternative (α,θ) parameterizations, as well as
to larger Montecarlo sample sizes (M), population sizes (N) and time horizons (T). See,
however, Section 4 for a brief discussion on the need for a deeper sensitivity analysis over
the whole parameter space.
3.1 Non-Weighted Minority Games over Frozen Networks
In the ﬁrst set of simulations, we study a system where agents play a non-weighted MG over
exogenously ﬁxed networks. This means that the initial interaction structure {V 0
i ,i∈ I}
is not allowed to change. Agents always observe the same local network and are rewarded
only if they play as the minority of their opponents. Furthermore, each opponent always
counts as one, irrespective of its past behavior – weights are always equal to one for each
link.
In such a setting, an interesting question arises about whether collective coordination
can be aﬀected by the size of the observation window held by the agents. In Figure 2 we










as the number of links with which we endow each agent (L0) changes.
Populations with a smaller number of links provide, on average, higher payoﬀ levels.
A better coordination is then achieved by playing with a smaller number of opponents.
In fact, if agents are only able to observe the world through a smaller window, it is more
likely that these windows do not overlap (that is, i ∈ V 0
j but j/ ∈ V 0
i ). This allows agents



























Figure 2: Montecarlo mean of population-average payoﬀs when agents play a non-weighted
MG over frozen networks and the initial number of links changes (L0=5, 25, 55). Monte-
carlo mean performed over M = 10 runs. Setup: N = 100, θ =0 .20.
Notice also that the high instability and frustrated behaviors often displayed in standard
MG are avoided (for similar ﬁndings in the context of nearest-neighbors interactions on
lattices, cf. Burgos, Ceva, and Perazzo (2004), Kalinowski, Schulz, and Briese (2000) and
Moelbert and De Los Rios (2002)). Our results suggest that local interactions can partly
replace individual memory: a stable collective behavior characterized by a better-than-
average coordination can be reached even if players cannot observe the last global winning
sides and cannot learn in the strategy space (cf. also Bottazzi, Devetag, and Dosi (2003)).
3.2 Weighted Minority Games over Frozen Networks
Let us turn now to the case where networks are still frozen but agents can weigh the
importance of the links they maintain. Notice that, in this setup, agents cannot discard
poorly performing links to add others, but they can attach diﬀerent beliefs about whether
the information coming to a particular opponent is useful in deciding their next-period
state.
Each opponent j in a given V 0
i then contributes to the decision at time t in proportion
12to its link-weight ηt
ij. In what follows, we suppose that the importance of memory in
weights dynamics is very high (α =0 .99). This means that the score et
ij currently earned
by the opponent j has a small impact in changing the assessments of agent i about its
beliefs over j.
When agents are allowed to “select which details to observe from their window”, the
collective behavior of the system sensibly changes as compared to the non-weighted case.
Indeed, populations holding a large number of links are now able to focus on smaller subsets
of trusted connections. The latter are the ones that, in the past, have guaranteed high
scores (see eq. 4). As a consequence, the population tends to break down into groups
of agents sharing the same state, which, however maintain very weak (if possibly no)
connections among them. Agents belonging to, say, a +1 group instead build connections


























Figure 3: Time-series of individual Ht
i indices, i =1 ,...,N, when agents play a weighted
MG over frozen networks. Values of Ht
i refer to a benchmark run. Setup: N = 100,
α =0 .99, θ =0 .20,L 0 = 55.
Such a clustering process entails a high degree of coordination among agents: it is
therefore very diﬃcult to achieve and very sensitive to small ﬂuctuations. To see this, we
report in Figure 3 all individual indices Ht
























Figure 4: Time-series of population average payoﬀs when agents play a weighted MG over
frozen networks. Payoﬀ values refer to the same benchmark run of Figure 3. Setup:
N = 100, α =0 .99, θ =0 .20,L 0 = 55.
that all indices increase when a feasible coordination pattern is under formation. However,
after such a clustered network has been built, any small change in the global state-weight
conﬁguration is able to disrupt the coordination pattern that has just emerged (for a similar
evidence in the context of open-ended economies self-organizing “on the edge of chaos”, cf.
Lindgren (1991)).
Population-average payoﬀs accordingly increase during the construction of the clustered
network and then falls after the latter has been destroyed, see Figure 4. The initial wave
(with Ht
i indices all increasing) is due to a larger and larger number of agents strengthening
their links to agents belonging to an opposite-state cluster. While more and more agents
join the cluster, the network falls apart. This causes a huge drop in both payoﬀs and Ht
i
values.
This oscillating behavior is not limited to the early stages of the simulation, but can be
observed at any time-scale. In a further set of exercises not reported here (but available
to the reader on request), we observed continuing oscillations until t = 50000, and, more
generally, well beyond the expected relaxation horizon.
14Interestingly enough, populations with an initially low number of links get now lower
average payoﬀs than their more connected counterparts (see Figure 5). This is because
weight assessment over a small number of agents does not provide a large enough pool




























Figure 5: Montecarlo mean of population-average payoﬀs when agents play a weighted MG
over frozen networks and the initial number of links changes (L0=5, 25, 55). Montecarlo
mean performed over M = 10 runs. Setup: N = 100, α =0 .99, θ =0 .20.
Note, however, that all three populations reach now (on average) higher payoﬀ levels
than in the previous case. This suggests that allowing for some endogeneity in network
formation (e.g., payoﬀ-dependent weight dynamics) implies a better collective performance.
To explore this intuition further, we move now to the endogenous networks setup.
3.3 Weighted Minority Games over Endogenous Networks
Let us now suppose that agents play a WMG and can endogenously delete badly-performing




i will delete it and replace it by another ij 
t, where j  is drawn at random
from the pool of all currently non-linked players.
15In this setup, the coordination process becomes quite eﬃcient and very rapid. Agents
typically split into two (almost) equally-sized groups: players in the ﬁrst persistently choose
the state +1, those in the other always select the state −1. Agents in one group maintain
a large majority of links with agents in the other group. This allows them eﬀortlessly to
get a positive reward and rapidly converge to an overall system conﬁguration characterized
by average payoﬀs πt very close (if not equal) to one. Therefore, despite the local nature
of interaction patterns, the population is able to “globally win” the MG by endogenously





































Figure 6: Montecarlo mean of population average H
t
index when agents play a weighted
MG over endogenous networks and the initial number of links changes (L0=5, 25, 55).
The cutoﬀ value for all three populations is µ =0 .50. Montecarlo means performed over
M = 10 runs. Setup: N = 100, α =0 .99, θ =0 .20.
What is more, convergence to a stable interaction pattern allowing for an eﬃcient
collective behavior does not generally depend on the initial degree of connectivity. Figure
















































Figure 7: Continuation of the simulation runs presented in Figure 6 after the cutoﬀ value
for the L0 = 5 population has been increased to µ =0 .80 at t = 1550. Montecarlo mean
of population average H
t
index performed over M = 10 runs. Setup: N = 100, α =0 .99,
θ =0 .20.
for three populations characterized by L0 =5 ,25,55. The two initially highly connected
populations (i.e. L0 =2 5 ,55) quickly converge to a steady-state with very high H
t
values.
Average payoﬀs πt for these two populations quickly converge towards 1.
Incidentally, notice that the average H
t
index follows a s-shaped pattern, i.e. the
signature of a diﬀusion process (Dosi, 1991). Indeed, when the two groups start forming,
an agent which is not yet part of any group can simply join one of them by selecting a
linked agent in the other group, similarly to what happens in an epidemic process.
Only the L0 = 5 population fails to stabilize. The Ht
i values are rather small, as
well as the population-average of weights. This prevents the worst performing links from
falling below the deletion threshold. Therefore, agents cannot eﬀectively employ network
adaptation to reach coordination.
However, if the cutoﬀ value increases, agents ﬁnd it easier to get rid of badly-performing
links. To see whether this is suﬃcient to trigger convergence to the eﬃcient state, we raised
on-the-ﬂy (around t = 1550) the cutoﬀ values of agents belonging to the L0 = 5 population
17to µ =0 .80. Figure 7 shows the continuation of the simulation presented in Figure 6. Now
the initially weakly-connected population is also able to converge to the eﬃcient stable
state.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study a local version of the MG, where agents initially hold directed
edges connecting them with other players in the population. Agents can only observe the
state chosen by their opponents in the last-period and care about being in the minority
of their own interaction group. To choose their next-period state, agents employ simple,
best-reply rules.
We have explored two network evaluation setups. In the ﬁrst, links are non-weighted
and agents simply count the number of their opponents in either state to decide which side
to take in the next period. In the second, links (that is, opponents) are attached a weight.
A weight evolves in a path-dependent way through time: its value increases only if the
information provided by the linked agent has been helpful in the past.
We start from a scenario where networks are frozen (links cannot be deleted/added)
and we then move to a system where endogenous networks are assumed (agents can discard
badly-performing links and replace them with other ones chosen at random).
Our results indicate that the very possibility of playing the MG locally and endoge-
nously acting over the network structure might strongly aﬀect the eﬃciency of collective
behavior. For example, even when agents cannot display path-dependent discrimination
among connections and must stick to an exogenously given network, eﬃciency can be in-
creased if agents hold small, local interaction groups. In a sense, individual memory can
be substituted for the information locally gathered by the players in a myopic way.
Furthermore, simulations show that the eﬃciency of the system can be greatly enhanced
by allowing players to act upon the structure of the network. Indeed, our results suggest
that populations playing a WMG over frozen networks are able to self-organize and build
18transient clustered networks that attain high payoﬀ levels. These self-organized conﬁgura-
tions are very sensitive to subsequent network reassessments: their disruption may generate
abrupt ﬂuctuations in average payoﬀs.
Such huge ﬂuctuations, as well as sub-optimal payoﬀ levels, may be avoided, however,
if agents are able to delete badly performing links and replace them with random ones.
Then, the population is able to “globally win” the WMG and consistently reach a stable
state where all agents get a positive payoﬀ. Provided that agents are suﬃciently willing
to discard links, this conclusion holds independently of the initial number of connections
assigned to each player.
These promising results should be more carefully scrutinized vis-` a-vis an extensive
Monte-Carlo analysis over the entire parameter space. For example, the role of the fre-
quency of state updating (θ) in shaping long-run properties of the system should be ad-
dressed in more detail.
Furthermore, we have shown that an adequate level for the cut-oﬀ parameter µ is able to
quickly move the whole population towards an eﬃcient state. Although we were interested
here in studying the very possibility of this event, it might be interesting to investigate
more deeply how this threshold value varies with N and L0. Preliminary exercises show
that the cut-oﬀ level required to trigger the replacement of badly performing links seems
to depend on the absolute number of links L0 only, rather than on the ratio L0/N, as one
could expect. The reason why this happens could be traced back to the initial distribution
of link weights {η0
ij}. In fact, our link replacement process possesses a self-reinforcing
nature: if agent i replaces a link at time t, its average evaluation ηt
i increases. This makes
more likely that agent i will replace another link at t + 1. This process goes on until all
links have very similar evaluations. However, to start the replacement process in the ﬁrst
place, we need at least one link falling suﬃciently below the average level, and this may
depend on the distribution of evaluations of the initial, randomly drawn evaluations over
the L0 links.
Finally, the relationships between network structure and collective behavior should be
19studied more deeply. For example, it might be interesting to assess how the ﬁne properties
of the network structure initially in place (e.g., presence and number of cycles, structural
and locational properties, etc.) aﬀect the coupled network-state dynamics in the system
(as well as the emergent network structure). More generally, the robustness of our results
might be tested against alternative network formation processes allowing for score functions
diﬀerent from (4) and endogenously changing interaction group sizes.
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